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As a result of the development of international tourist facilities, the 
Great Barrier Reef is today considered Queensland's major tourist 
asset. Until the 1960s, however, it was valued primarily for its natural 
resources. The mother-of-pearl industry was the first large scale 
industry exploiting reef resources. The pearl-shell (Pinctada maxima) 
was harvested in order to export its nacreous internal lining, which 
was processed overseas mainly as mother-of-pearl buttons. 
Pearl-shelling was a multi-cultural, multi-national activity in which 
the Japanese gained prominence despite state and federal government 
efforts to curb their participation. Japanese nationals assumed such 
a leading role in this industry that any discussion inevitably concerns 
the Japanese involvement in it. Both the success and, by the same 
token, the eventual failure of the industry may be ascribed to its 
dependence on Japanese participation. The ascendancy of the 
Japanese in this industry is a phenomenon of some historical interest, 
because it led to the only formal exception ever made to the White 
Australia Policy. This essay explains the Japanese dominance both 
in terms of why Japanese were introduced and employed in large 
numbers in Australia, and why they themselves found it attractive to 
come here. It examines the perceptions of Japanese divers in Australia 
from the perspective of eye-witnesses and participants, who were 
interviewed between 1986 and 1989. 
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In the mother-of-pearl industry, the Japanese were celebrated as 
heroes, respected as hard workers, but also condemned as poachers 
and as spies for an enemy government. The AustraUan image of the 
Japanese is contradictory, a mixture of awe and antagonism. The 
success of the Japanese is usually ascribed to a certain national 
character — industriousness, commitment to a work ethic, and 
competitiveness. Aborigines say of the Japanese that they were 'too 
smart for the rest.' Japanese themselves also often explain their actions 
in terms of a national character but this is insufficient explanation 
of their success in the AustraUan pearl-shelUng industry. The three-
fold explanation for their success rests in the motivation of Japanese 
to participate in the industry, their strong social organisation, and 
the attitude of Australian master pearlers who delegated the practical 
management of the industry to Japanese employees despite the 
encroachment on managerial and ownership prerogatives which this 
engendered. 
The Japanese success had three dimensions: they were numerically 
dominant being the largest ethnic group in the industry; they were 
hierarchically dominant as they almost completely filled the highest 
occupational stratum on the 'shopfloor'; and they successfully entered 
into competition with Australian employers as entrepreneurs 
themselves. The reasons for this success lie in the political economy 
of the industry. The low wages were only attractive to recruits from 
impoverished backgrounds. The governmental regulation of ethnic 
groups including Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders delimited their 
employment opportunities. (Those ranked lower in the 'hierarchy of 
races' which characterized race theory at the time, were afforded more 
'protection' in the form of closer government supervision.) Finally, 
the expansion of the industry from territorial into extraterritorial 
waters, together with the admission that the industry could not be 
conducted without Japanese labour, permitted the Japanese to 
challenge the Australian ownership monopoly. 
THE EARLY PHASE 
In North Queensland pearl-shelling commenced in 1868.^  InitiaUy 
it was the province of Sydney and London-based companies, the large 
South Pacific trading companies such as Burns Philp and Robert 
Towns. As tradeable resources in the Pacific, particularly sandalwood, 
were becoming exhausted in the 1860s, these companies equipped 
captains to set up shore stations in Torres Strait on which at first South 
Sea Islanders and Torres Strait Islanders were employed for swimming 
diving. Skindivers raised shell from 6 to 8 fathoms (ca. 10 - 15 m) 
without any technological aid, but under intensive harvesting the 
shallow beds became exhausted within five years. As early as 1871, 
diving suits with brass helmets and lead weights were introduced which 
afforded access to shell beds in depths of up to 15 fathoms (27.4m)l 
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The first dress divers were white men who had indentured Malays 
and Filipinos as crews. Many of the captains had share trading 
agreements with the trading companies which enabled them to buy 
their luggers and become independent producers. As they paid off 
their luggers, ownership diversified and by the 1880s pearling was a 
fully fledged industry with Thursday Island as its thriving centre. In 
1883 there were 33 pearling stations and 206 licensed vessels in the 
Torres Strait. The value of mother-of-pearl exports was between 
50,000 and 100,000, and pearl-sheU became the fourth largest 
export earner after beef, wool and gold, contributing significantly 
to northern development. Australia became the world's biggest 
producer of mother-of-pearl. 
By the late 1880s, the quality and size of shell began to dwindle, 
and diving became less profitable. White men withdrew from diving 
and the industry was once more characterized by large companies. 
The white divers were gradually replaced by Pacific Islanders and 
Asians, particularly Malays, Filipinos and Japanese. Due to the 
mixture of nationalities engaged in pearl-shelling at this time, 
Thursday Island gained a reputation as "the sink of the Pacific". 
Ownership of luggers remained, however, in the hands of white 
families, who were referred to as master pearlers. The imported divers 
were engaged on conditions similar to those of white divers: the diver 
was in chdrge of the lugger and worked on a lay system, rather than 
for wages. He was paid according to the amount of shell raised, with 
the bonus increasing on a sliding scale. Torres Strait divers were quite 
independent of their employers. They claimed any pearls found for 
themselves, and had great freedom in making the day-to-day decisions 
in the operation of the luggers. The head diver was responsible for 
recruiting, and out of his lay he paid for the rations, repair of 
equipment, and wages, while the master pearler provided for the boat, 
equipment and boat repairs. 
THE ROLE AND IMAGE OF DIVERS 
With the introduction of dress diving, the role of diver became 
prestigious, not only because the diver was usually in charge of the 
lugger, but also because of the considerable risk involved. A new kind 
of hero emerged. Divers had a reputation for dying early and 
becoming crippled from the effects of divers' bends. An eyewitness 
in 1908 observed that "after seven years a diver is spent and not fit 
for diving any longer". The resident surgeon on Thursday Island said 
"I knew a Japanese who lived at the game up to 45 years of age.'"' 
This was held up as unusual. The death rate among divers was 
staggering, at around ten percent per annum.' One particularly 
hazardous area near Darnley Island was called Graveyard, because 
of the numerous brass helmets scattered on the bottom where divers 
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had died. The Darnley Deeps reach to depths of 35 and 40 fathoms 
(63-72 m), and in 1893 alone, 25 divers lost their lives there. Diving 
accidents were so common that 1920 was the first year in which "no 
fatalities" were reported. The dangers associated with hard helmet 
diving gave rise to the image of the tough, heroic diver, battling with 
nature and the elements, which has been romanticised in journalistic 
accounts, in popular literature such as that of Ion Idriess, and in films 
Uke Noel Monkman's "King of the Coral Sea" starring Chips 
Rafferty. 
From 1925 to 1940, at least ninety percent of these tough, heroic 
divers were Japanese. In their own country, the Japanese were awarded 
full credit for this role. Even today former pearl-shell divers enjoy 
the status of minor celebrities in Japan, comparable perhaps to our 
Anzac veterans. A Mokuyoto-kai (Thursday Island Club) was formed 
in Wakayama Prefecture, the home of many of the Thursday Island 
divers, to erect a monument at Thursday Island in 1979 in honour 
of the Japanese divers who had died there. One family whose brother 
had died at Thursday Island, contributed two miUion Yen to the 
monument. The Japanese press remains receptive to news items 
relating to former "Arafura Divers". A Japanese historian of the 
industry, Ogawa Taira, said that even the white women on Thursday 
Island would lift their hats if a diver passed them on the streets.* 
Dress divers had a high standing in the industry. Because fatigue 
increases the risk of divers' bends, the divers were relieved from 
t. t*" V '*; ?'*e*dMU^.^! ;*j 
Japanese marching to Pearlers'Association Office at Thursday Island, 
most likely in 1923. John Oxley Library 
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unnecessary exhaustion, and a strictly hierarchical division of tasks 
emerged. One former diver explained that as a diver: 
you had nothing more heavy to carry than your ricebowl and 
chopsticks. You were not supposed to exhaust yourself so that you 
wouldn't get bends. Even older people would assist you.^ 
Divers enjoyed special privileges both on land and at sea: 
The divers had great respect. They could walk around town, whereas 
deckles stayed on the lugger. They had one cup of (fresh) water to 
brush their teeth under the main mast. (The deckhand) had to bring 
him the water. Deckles used saltwater.* 
(Fresh water had to be carefully rationed because if it ran low, the 
fishing trip had to be cut short.) 
THE MOTIVATION OF JAPANESE DIVERS 
The Japanese first arrived in numbers in the 1880s when master 
pearlers started to recruit in Japan, indenturing them on three-year 
contracts. Most pearl-shell divers on Thursday Island came from just 
a few vUlages in one province, Wakayama. Their villages were perched 
precariously on the extremely narrow coastline between rugged 
mountains and rocky shores. Competition for arable land was fierce, 
and the villagers eked out an existence with a combined 
fishing/farming economy. Before World War II, Wakayama had no 
infrastructural link with Tokyo, and in the imagination of these 
villagers Tokyo was further away than Thursday Island. In certain 
villages it was common for the more enterprising young men to go 
to Thursday Island if they had the chance, to escape the narrow career 
opportunities and poverty at home. Most illustrative of the close link 
between Japan and Thursday Island is perhaps the fact, that the tiny 
island port has a Japanese name — Mokuyo-to.' 
Former Japanese divers invariably give the prospect of handsome 
earnings as their main reason for leaving home. Wages that were 
meagre by Australian standards were considered attractive in the 
Japanese context. Eighteen-year olds could earn the equivalent wage 
of a Japanese high school principal if they ventured to Thursday 
Island, and many substantial houses were built in these Japanese 
villages from the money earned at Thursday Island. To be a diver 
would enhance both their economic and social standing at home. Men 
returning with fortunes entrenched the high status of deep-sea divers 
in Japan. In 1890 a syndicate of ten Japanese won| £ 22,500 in the 
Melbourne Cup sweepstakes. Four of them returned to Wakayama 
as rich men and are still remembered there. This incident contributed 
significantly to the flow of indentured workers from that area to 
Thursday Island.'" Those at home did not fuUy reaUze that the 
prosperity of these men did not rest on the wages they had earned, 
but on an extraordinary stroke of luck. 
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The Japanese in the mother-of-pearl industry did not seek to create 
a new life for themselves in Australia. Their primary orientation was 
towards their home and their families. While they were in Australia, 
they were prepared to take risks and content themselves with difficult 
working conditions. A former diver described the ideal that sustained 
Japanese pearl-shellers in their hard work: 
1 went to Australia to make money. If I worked as a cook for two 
years (on a lugger) I could build a big house (. . .) In Japan it would 
take you fifty years to earn that sort of money. I endured for ten 
years, yes endured." 
Even those who stayed most of their working lives thought of 
themselves as temporary visitors at Thursday Island. One Japanese 
diver who spent sixteen years there between 1927 and 1946 called 
Thursday Island his second home. Nevertheless, he said that "It was 
money we wanted, so we could eat.'"^ Another former diver 
explained: 
If you were a diver and saved your money you could return to Japan 
quickly. All the young men wanted to be divers. ( . . . ) That's why 
there were many accidents among young divers, they wanted to make 
money fast. It is a Japanese trait to be greedy. We want everything 
quickly. The Chinese would bury their bone on Thursday Island 
and make a fortune, but the Japanese are not like that, they want 
to go home again quickly.'^  
The motivation to return to Japan quickly with as much money as 
possible gained the Japanese a reputation as hardworking people. 
Most of them sent money home to support their famUies. If they did 
not have enough money they would seek an advance on their wages 
and indebt themselves. It was common practice to 'oversign', to sign 
on again for another three-year term. The lay system offered financial 
incentives for divers to maximize their catch. The way in which 
responsibility was shared between the owner and the diver well-nigh 
indemnified master pearlers against loss on the working of the vessel. 
It was the head diver who bore the risk of loss when sheU-beds were 
becoming depleted, when weather conditions were unfavourable, or 
when the market prices dropped.''' The onus was on the Japanese 
themselves to make the endeavour profitable. If beche-de-mer were 
caught, they worked on through the night: 
you had no time to sleep, you have to make money, see? (. . .) By 
the time all of the fees were subtracted there was nothing left if you 
didn't have a good tonnage."' 
The Japanese took turns to navigate at night, so that as little time 
as possible was lost in moving from one shell bed to the next. The 
work-day on diving boats started in the small hours of the day: 
As a cook I got up at 2 or 3 am, made a yeast dough, cooked rice 
and miso soup, then baked the bread. The divers were down before 
sunrise.'* 
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It is said of one skipper that he slept on deck instead of on his 
bunk, in order not to become too lazy.'^ With this kind of 
motivation, the Japanese made an attractive workforce in an industry 
which relied substantially on the performance of the divers to increase 
profits. 
EMPLOYERS' PREFERENCES FOR JAPANESE WORKERS 
The master pearlers, particularly the large companies such as Burns 
Philp and James Clark (the 'pearl king of Australia'), welcomed the 
Japanese for their reliability and hardworking attitude. James Clark 
argued that "it is a well-understood fact that the Japanese diver is 
the best in the world for getting sheU".'* He had visited the areas 
from where the Japanese were recruited, and realistically ascribed their 
suitability for the job to their poverty at home. Other master pearlers 
had only a faint idea of the backgrounds of their employees and 
tended to ascribe to the Japanese a kind of innate capacity for diving. 
It was said that they possessed a special faculty for finding shell, 
similar to Aboriginal tracking skills. It was accepted as fact among 
master pearlers, and repeated by government officials, that their 
religion made the Japanese reckless ("they consider that when their 
time is come they go""). This explanation was not chaUenged by the 
observation that Malays, who were known to be "more easily scared", 
were Muslims, and therefore also fatalists. The master pearlers thought 
the Japanese indispensable and irreplaceable. This was expressed with 
frequent statements like: "I do not think you can beat the Japanese 
for keeping at his work. He is a most determined worker"^" or 
"diving is harder on a white man than on a coloured man (. . .) he 
cannot stand the strain so well, and in a few years he is worn out."^' 
Diving was considered inappropriate and unattractive for white men. 
One master pearler said "1 do not think you would ever get white 
men to put up with the life they would have to live on luggers".^^ 
To put a perspective on the preference of master pearlers for 
Japanese, it must be emphasized that all the recruits in the industry 
were administered according to ethnic origin under different sets of 
legislation which enhanced or diminished the incentive to work. For 
example, Aborigines, administered under the Aboriginal Protection 
Act, could not hope to achieve social mobility from their participation 
in the industry. Their earnings were banked and dispersed by 
Protectors, so that wages did not afford them discretionary spending. 
Nor was their recruitment always voluntary. Because of these different 
sets of protective and restrictive legislation, work ethic and suitability 
for employment presented themselves as attributes classifiable 
according to race, and came to be understood as innate 
predispositions. However, the factors predisposing Japanese to success 
in the industry were not innate characteristics, such as physical. 
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reUgious or racial determinants, but were related to their social 
organisation and to the benefits derived from their work within a 
legislative framework which prevented indigenous labour from 
organizing themselves in a simUar way and gaining similar benefits. 
The Japanese were thought to be indispensable to the industry, but 
their dominant role was never uncontested. On the one hand, they 
were a useful workforce, on the other, their commercial creativity 
presented a challenge to white ownership. This meant that the 
Japanese presence in Australia was subject to great tension. 
THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY 
By 1893, the Japanese population at Thursday Island was almost 
as large as the Caucasian population.^^ Japanese were combining to 
buy and lease luggers, and operated several boatsUps, so that they 
were moving out of their position as divers in the service of master 
pearlers, into competition with them. In the 1890s the concern was 
often expressed that the whole pearl-shelling industry was passing into 
Japanese hands^'', and the Queensland Government began to oppose 
the flow of workers from Japan. The Pearl-Shell and Beche-de-mer 
Fishery Act was amended in December 1898 so that aliens could not 
rent boats or be issued boat licences. This amendment was openly 
directed against Japanese, and was intended to safeguard a white 
ownership monopoly.^' However, Japanese continued to run luggers 
by boat dummying — a white owner simply lent his name to a boat 
licence for an annual rent. Because of the way in which the industry 
was normally conducted, with the diver holding a large part of the 
financial responsibility, dummying was impossible to prove, and it 
was profitable for those 'verandah pearlers' who lent their name to 
a licence. Professionals, shopkeepers, and even Burns Philp were 
among these 'verandah pearlers'.^'' As a resuU, the legislation was 
fairly ineffectual in curbing the vested interest which Japanese 
nationals were developing in the industry. An executive strategy, 
however, turned the Japanese into a captive workforce for the mother 
of pearl industry. Any Japanese entering the State now required the 
prior approval of the Queensland government, and aU applications 
for entry of Japanese were rejected unless they were made by white 
master pearlers. The recruits were issued with an identification 
certificate (showing their fingerprint and two photographs) which was 
only valid for the purpose of diving in Australia. The employer covered 
the cost of passage and deposited a bond of £100 with the 
Queensland Government as a safeguard that indentured labourers did 
not seek employment on the mainland. 
After the federation of the Australian colonies, immigration 
restriction was high on the list of priorities of the new federal 
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government. The Melanesians were repatriated, and the sugar industry 
reorganized. Both Queensland and Federal governments sought to take 
similar steps for the pearl-shell industry. A Royal Commission in 1908 
sought to devise strategies to displace the Japanese from the industry. 
It was thought that with proper scientific support diving could be 
made safe and profitable enough to attract white divers. The 
government envisaged small owner-operators as in the early beginnings 
of the industry, and was prepared to experiment with the artificial 
cultivation of pearl-shell and to subsidize the industry if it offered 
sufficient employment for white labour to warrant this support. In 
1911 instructions were issued that within two years Japanese tenders 
and crew were to be completely replaced by Malays, and all divers 
were to be white men. But master pearlers were not prepared to 
reorganize the industry to put it on a truly Australian footing. They 
were unimpressed with the prospect of success in artificial cultivation 
and insisted that the industry would fail without the Japanese divers. 
They organised an experiment to test the superior merit of white divers 
by recruiting ten British certified deep-sea divers who were familiar 
with the navy's staging techniques. Three died from divers' paralysis 
and the others gave up. James Clark noted with thinly veUed 
satisfaction, that none of them had raised more shell than an untrained 
Asian try-diver. ^ ^ This experiment was often cited thereafter to 
dismiss suggestions for reform, but it has been suggested that the area 
where the experiment was conducted had been carefully selected with 
a view to its failure.^* 
The Japanese Club at Thursday Island 3 November 1910, celebrating 
the birthday of the Meji emperor. Ogawa Taira 
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A further inquiry was commissioned in 1913. The Bamford 
Commission eventually rejected the notion that white AustraUans 
could replace coloured divers. It accepted the master pearlers' 
argument that the replacement of coloured with white labour would 
have meant an increase in production costs as in the sugar industry, 
but that unlike sugar, mother-of-pearl was a luxury item already in 
danger of substitution by other materials, so that the increased cost 
could not be passed on to the market without endangering the industry 
as a whole. The Bamford Commission pointed out that white divers 
were not attracted to the industry because of the harsh working 
conditions and health risks. 
These were the reasons given to exempt the mother of pearl industry 
from the White Australia Policy. Another factor was decisive in this 
policy shift. It was realized that the sheUing industry was largely 
carried out in waters outside the territorial limit, so that Australia 
had no actual jurisdiction over the pearling grounds. Both Australian 
and overseas fleets could register under the Dutch flag of convenience 
and harvest the grounds from Merauke in Dutch New Guinea (or 
Dutch Timor instead of Broome). Some master pearlers had 
foreshadowed this course of action when giving evidence. The 
government preferred to continue allowing the use of coloured labour 
in order to retain some jurisdiction over the industry, to retain the 
revenue from it, and to be seen to support an AustraUan industry. 
The only further governmental action to restrict Japanese 
dominance was to limit the number of indentured men from the same 
ethnic background to a maximum of five on the same boat in 1923. 
Despite this restriction, Japanese increased their dominance in diving. 
The number of divers from other nationaUties continued to dwindle, 
so that from 1925 to 1935 only one or two dress divers out of an 
average of 140 were not Japanese. 
THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF JAPANESE DIVERS 
Interviews with former Japanese pearl-shell divers provide a key 
to understanding the inexorable appropriation of the diving role by 
Japanese. When asked how they arrived at the decision to work in 
Australia, the typical answer was that of Takemoto Iwakichi: 
My uncle had been working on Mokuyo-to and arranged for me 
to come, he sent a 'letter of calling', and taught me to dive. (. . .) 
My only brother also went to Mokuyo-to before the war. There was 
no income here, you could only be a fisherman, farmer or carpenter, 
and on Mokuyo-to you earned twice as much.^ ^ 
Their social organisation at Thursday Island served as a basis for 
the success of the Japanese in the industry. The ceilings that had been 
applied to the entry of Japanese were intended to place a check on 
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their dominance. But instead, these ceiUngs entrenched their 
appropriation of the diving role through nepotism, because kinship 
ties were a prime criterion of recruitment. It was the prerogative of 
the head-diver to nominate new recruits. If more workers were needed, 
the head-diver requested the master pearler to send 'letters of calling' 
(a request for labour) to recruitment firms in Japan and the new 
recruits were usually relatives of one of the divers. This practice meant 
that other nationalities were less likely to be recruited into diving. 
It also cemented the social cohesion of the Japanese workforce, who 
came from the same or neighbouring viUages and knew each other's 
families. They formed little colonies away from home. 
The Japanese recruits formed close-knit groups which imposed 
strict behavioural norms on its members. The new recruits were 
generally assigned to the captain who had nominated them, and on 
Thursday Island the Japanese stayed together according to their 
villages, in boarding houses called Susami house, Kushimoto house, 
Izumo house, etc. The newcomers were normally signed on as cooks 
for a year, and then progressed along a career ladder as enginemen, 
tenders and try-divers, before becoming divers. The new recruits were 
like personal servants for the head-diver: 
We were the inferiors of (our captain). He could order us to wash 
his clothes. The youngest on the ship worked for the eldest. You 
rowed him ashore and picked him up again if he wanted to go to 
a movie. ( . . . . ) It was a very lowly experience.^ " 
A Japanese diver explained the discipUne on board: 
Living on a lugger was similar to military service, with strict 
hierarchies and lines of command. The captain was obeyed at all 
times. It is a Japanese tradition to live in a hierarchy. '^ 
Some senior Japanese fulfilled the role of oyakata , or patriarchal 
employers, for groups of Japanese. They handled the money and 
transmitted savings of the younger crew, issued work clothes, and 
stipulated the standard of dress required to go to town. The young 
recruits had a great degree of personal dependence on such leaders: 
I was under the care of Yamashita Haruoshi, the president of the 
Japanese Club. He was in his 40s or 50s and took care of everybody, 
also concerning the wages. He sent my money home, I never had 
any money. We had no need for spending money. Even clothes were 
supplied by the elders. (. . .) The money I sent home might have 
been 200 Yen per month, but I really can't remember, because I 
never saw the money, only the receipts. We never doubted Yamashita, 
he was like a father. ^ ^ 
I needed a white shirt and pants if I wanted to go to the 
movies. Yamashita made sure we kept good appearances if 
we went to town, no shorts were allowed. We didn't need 
clothes to work, only if we wanted to go to the movies or 
drinking." 
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The divers were organized in a fraternity, the Doshi-kai, which 
strictly speaking excluded the Japanese crew, the deckhands and 
tenders. The Doshi-kai led the annual negotiations with the master-
pearlers in which the rates, bonuses and wage structure for crews were 
determined. Despite this consultative system, in some instances the 
Japanese resorted to organized industrial action, either to protect the 
Japanese diving monopoly or to maintain their wage structure in the 
face of falling mother-of-pearl prices. Major strikes occurred in 1908, 
1923, and 1929. In the 1930s there was a large number of boats 
procuring pearl-shell, so that there was a constant problem of over-
supply and prices were on a downward trend. Master pearlers agreed 
with monopoly buyers on output restrictions to curb the production 
of shell. In 1935 the Japanese again protested against the terms of 
employment offered to them, and refused to commence work in the 
new season. Some employers dismissed all Japanese divers and laid 
up their boats until they obtained Malay divers to recommission their 
luggers later in the season. This introduction of Malay divers broke 
the Japanese monopoly over the diving position. 
Passport photo of a young diver, Nishikawa Konematsu. Cairns, 1920. 
Ogawa Taira 
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THE JAPANESE AS COMPETITORS 
During the 1930s the Japanese actively sought an independent role 
in the mother-of-pearl industry. The discovery of rich pearl beds near 
Bathurst Island north of Darwin attracted fleets from Thursday Island 
as well as from Japan. Japanese sampans started to raise pearl-shell 
in extra-territorial waters and sightings of Japanese poachers inside 
the three mile limit were frequently reported in the press. Japan had 
become the sole importer of Australian trochus shell, and Japanese 
firms now evidently sought to participate in the primary production 
of the shell. Well-financed companies such as Mitsui and Seicho Maru 
used the Japanese mandated territory of Palau as a base for their fleets 
to raise shell off the north Australian coast. The yearly increase of 
Japanese sampans in the north started another wave of anti-Japanese 
protest. In 1934 ten Japanese luggers fished in the North, in 1936 there 
were 74, and in 1938 the Japanese activity reached its peak as a fleet 
of 165 Japanese vessels coUected 3500 tons of shell, an amount 
exceeding the total Australian production.^'' Japan displaced 
Australia as the world's largest producer of mother-of-pearl. The 
Japanese fleets were supported by research vessels making surveys of 
the ocean bed, and ichthyologists studied the growth of mother-of-
pearl shell and experimented with pearl cultivation and the artificial 
development of shell beds in Micronesia. This level of scientific 
support was unparalleled in AustraUa. 
By 1938 the foreign markets for pearl-shell were severely glutted, 
while marketing had become more difficult given the tense 
international position in Europe and Asia. The Japanese fleets 
undersold Australian producers. They were not subject to the controls 
applying to Australian-owned vessels and disregarded the restrictions 
which had long been placed on the raising of undersized shell: 
When they go over a reef they are like a cloud of locusts, and leave 
nothing behind them, not even a clam shell.^' 
The Japanese entry into the field subverted the solidarity of 
Australian master pearlers. The Australians started to engage in price 
cutting, selUng at rates that scarcely covered expenses. In this crisis, 
the rugged individualism of master pearlers, and the rivalry between 
the pearling centres Thursday Island, Darwin and Broome proved 
highly detrimental. There was no leadership structure able to enforce 
the discipline required to stabUize the market. 
For Australians, Japanese increasingly became competitors rather 
than docile workers, and the image of poachers and spies became 
dominant. The activities of Japanese fleets were centred around 
Broome and Darwin, but some also came down along the Great 
Barrier Reef to gather trochus shell and beche-de-mer. Claude and 
Harold White were living at Percy Island from 1921 to 1965, and 
remember some unwelcome Japanese visits at this time: 
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Harold: Just before the war, we had the Japanese in with sampans. 
They were alright, but they got a bit cheeky at times. My 
mother had a cockatoo and they wanted it so badly, we 
had to put it away or they would have pinched it. We had 
gelignite for removing stumps etc. The Japs saw it and 
wanted it to blow fish up. We had to hide it. We couldn't 
stop them because under federal government regulations 
they were allowed to land as shipwrecked sailors for wood 
and water. 
Claude: We were very nervous about the Japs. We had no patrol 
boats and nothing. We couldn't have a personal war with 
them. 
Harold: They broke the laws in all ways. They got undersized shell, 
they'd take anything. (. . .) Before that the pearhng luggers 
had (indentured) Japanese, they were fine people.^* 
With the approach of World War II, Australians increasingly feared 
that these Japanese constituted a defence risk, and that they were 
charting the reefs on behalf of the Japanese Navy. The Sub-Collector 
of Customs at Thursday Island regarded every Japanese in Australia 
as a potential spy. But at a higher level the Japanese activities were 
viewed with much less concern. The Brisbane Investigation Branch 
ascribed purely commercial significance to the Japanese presence, as 
did the Director of Intelligence in the Department of Defence." 
However, there is little doubt that some of these Japanese who came 
in the 1930s acted on behalf of their government. The Japanese 
historian Ogawa Taira said that: 
These ships were requisitioned by the Japanese navy as spy ships 
to Palau, the Philippines, New Guinea, Borneo, Java, etc. They 
carried cargo and personnel, and made charts of the foreign ports, 
noting where water, bananas, potatoes, and so on could be obtained. 
They were instructed to do so three years before the outbreak of 
war. 1 spoke to one of the captains myself.^ * 
In 1939 a larger than usual number of divers returned to Japan 
and the Japanese government refused permission for new recruits to 
leave Japan.^' For those who remained in Australia, their staying 
power proved to be a mixed blessing. In December 1942 aU Japanese 
were sent to internment camps in Hay, New South Wales, and Tatura, 
Victoria, on instructions from General McArthur. They saw themselves 
as civilians and felt protected in the knowledge that they were not 
properly speaking prisoners of war. When they were released from 
Hay after four years, in 1946, the Japanese arrived back in war-torn 
Japan with their Australian savings, which should have been the 
foundation for a prosperous future, but rampant inflation in Japan 
rendered their fortunes worthless. One former pearl-sheller said that 
he had hoped to build a house with his savings, but on his return 
to Japan in 1946, all he could buy with it was two tetami (straw) 
mats."" 
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During the war, only small quantities of shell were raised, by Torres 
Strait Islanders working from luggers provided by the Department 
of Native Affairs. After World War II, master pearlers sought to 
resume the employment of Japanese divers. But the Torres Strait 
Islanders now allied themselves with the Australian Legion of Ex-
Servicemen and Women to resist the re-introduction of Japanese. In 
spite of popular protests, a group of 35 Japanese were permitted to 
work in the 1952/53 season at Broome on a trial basis. However, the 
Japanese govermnent used this request as a diplomatic lever. It initially 
declined passports to the group because Japanese luggers were refused 
entry into the Northern Australian waters."' Japan was now making 
a full-blown bid for the pearl-shell beds. 
THE DECLINE OF AUSTRALIAN PEARI^SHELLING 
After the war, Australia sought to extend its jurisdiction from the 
traditional three-mile limit to the continental shelf, but Japan 
threatened to challenge this claim before the International Court of 
Justice, insisting, as it always had done, on the freedom of the high 
seas. The entire territorial dispute was fought over the issue of the 
mother-of-pearl industry. In order to succeed with this claim before 
the International Court of Justice, Australia needed to demonstrate 
the use of these waters by Australians. But apart from Torres Strait 
Islanders, Australians showed no disposition to enter the industry as 
deep-sea divers, and the pre-war activities of Japanese fleets weakened 
Australia's historical argument. It was clearly preferable to resolve 
the issue by political rather than legal means, and the federal 
government finally negotiated a bilateral trade agreement. 42 
Kushimoto town farewells a pearling fleet departing for the Arafura 
Sea, c. 1954. Takimoto Iwakichi 
280 
Japanese-owned fishing and pearUng fleets were permitted into 
Australian waters with certain restrictions and Japan became a trading 
partner for Australia, placing large orders for beef, and exporting 
motor-cars. Japan also obtained the rights to fish for tuna and to 
capture whales in the Great Barrier Reef Province. The fleet departed 
from Japan in 1954 with much ceremony and press coverage. The 
Asashi Shimbun commented "Let the dream come once more", and 
cited the Japanese pearl-shellers' song: 
250 fathoms at the bottom of the Arafura Sea, 
There bloom the flowers of the white pearl oyster shells. 
As far as the eye can see, 
a gold mine we see."' 
Again, the high level of organization of the Japanese mother-of-
pearl industry deserves a mention. The fleet consisted of 25 vessels 
financed by the Japanese Development Bank. (Meanwhile Australians 
found it very difficult to raise loans for fishing vessels.) The Japanese 
fleet was accompanied by a mother ship so that it could stay at sea 
for the entire season, without coming into port to deUver shell and 
fetch supplies. The mother ship was also fitted with a decompression 
chamber. A Japanese survey vessel, equipped with an echo sounder, 
continually prospected for new grounds. The Japanese Fisheries 
Bureau conducted a one-week training course for aU crew, and their 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave lessons in international law and 
current world affairs before they came to Australia. All this bespeaks 
a high degree of political, scientific and financial cooperation. 
The restrictions imposed on the Japanese fleet by the AustraUan 
government were ostensibly to conserve sheU resources. They consisted 
of an annual catch quota of between 1000 and 1250 tons of shell, 
the restriction to certain fishing areas, and a prohibition against taking 
undersized sheU. The fleet was not permitted to fish within 10 miles 
of the coast, or further south than 22nd lat. The Japanese vessels 
were permitted to obtain 50 tons of pearl-sheU each, while the average 
return of Thursday Island boats was 10 to 11 tons. But the formidation 
of catch quotas and the allocation of areas was not guided by scientific 
expertise. The pearl-shell beds had never been surveyed and stocks 
were much too optimisticaUy estimated. The AustraUan Fisheries 
Inspector who accompanied the Japanese fleets considered the regime 
'worked weU', although it did not conserve the pearl-sheU stocks. As 
the Japanese fleet continued to fall short of its allocated quota, the 
Australian government steadily relaxed its restrictions in order to 
appear reasonable. The restrictions imposed on the Japanese 
represented a political advantage rather than a sincere effort to 
conserve stocks. 
To satisfy Australian master pearlers without offending anti-
Japanese sentiments, the indenture of 106 Okinawans was permitted 
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in 1958. Okinawa was an American mandated territory, so that it could 
be argued that the recruits were not actually Japanese people. Some 
of the recruits were fishermen, some had dived for trochus shell, and 
some were salvage divers, but none had done pearl-shell diving and 
they were all unfamiliar with Australian conditions. 
The agreements were very good, but when we arrived in Australia 
things were different. We had been promised that the boats would 
be ready with first class gear, but no gear was set when we arrived, 
and we just stayed at T.I. for several months. Okay, we didn't know 
the Australian water. We were seamen but we didn't know about 
pressure. They had promised a pilot for each boat to show us. It 
was supposed to be very deep pressure, thirty fathoms (54 m) or 
more. It was important to have good gear. You need two compressors 
in case one engine breaks down (but there was only one on each 
boat). (. . .) The company supphed food but it was all rubbish, 
sometimes just two tins of meat for the whole crew, and rice. 
According to the agreement we were supposed to have plenty of 
tucker and meat. But the company was greedy like that. That's why 
all the boys went on strike. 
Master pearlers remember this experiment as a disaster, and Torres 
Strait Islanders who had worked under Japanese skippers before the 
war saw the arrival of this workforce as a hilarious reversal of pre-
war relations: "they didn't know anything — we had to teach 
them!""' The Okinawans were repatriated before the expiry of their 
contracts: 
They wouldn't allow the Japs in but they allowed the Okinawans 
in. That was the downfall of the pearling. (. . .) It cost a lot of money 
to rig up the boats, and they got hardly any shell. (. . .) The 
Okinawans were dying off with bends, they didn't know anything 
about staging. They were dying like flies (about 12 or 14 died — 
not nearly enough), and all went on strike. They all came inshore 
and refused to go on the boats (. . .) Those who didn't go on strike 
(well) we had to lay up the boats anyway, because we had to- feed 
them and they weren't picking up any shell. (Five out of our six 
boats were laid up.) (. . .) We sent them home as soon as we could 
but we didn't have the money to send them back, it just about broke 
us. It was dreadful."* 
The insistence of master pearlers on the re-introduction of Japanese 
after the war demonstrates that the success of Japanese in the role 
of divers came to be considered as a kind of innate capacity for diving, 
a 'national trait'. Even Okinawans, who had never previously been 
engaged in pearl-shell diving, were expected to be more suited than 
the locally available labour. 
Only when the experiment with Okinawan divers failed, did the 
master pearlers resort to local labour as dress divers, and found, 
somewhat to their surprise, that "they were marvellous"."^ The 
people they employed were mainly mixed descendants of Malays and 
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Torres Strait Islanders, who were not administered under the 
Aboriginal Protection Act. They also worked on a lay system, and 
adopted the same disciplined attitude as the former Japanese skippers 
had. The young divers were as reckless as the Japanese had been in 
risking their lives to increase the catch. Given the same work 
conditions and rewards, the supposed 'racial attributes' were 
inconsequential. 
In the early 1960s the industry lost some eighty percent of its market 
with the development of durable plastics for the manufacture of 
buttons. Some white master pearlers went into the employ of Japanese 
companies who had developed pearl culture. What little activity is 
now taking place in Torres Strait is practically all Japanese-owned, 
and dependent on Japanese expertise. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Japanese contributed considerably to the success of the 
mother-of-pearl industry is beyond doubt. More than any other 
workforce, they were willing to take risks, work for low wages, and 
work hard. They were a cheap workforce in an industry which had 
lost touch with the normal Australian industrial context. Under 
normal Australian industrial conditions, regulated by minimum wages 
and Workers' Compensation legislation, the industry could not have 
survived as long as it did. It became the sole exception to the White 
Australia Policy. 
The failure of the industry was the reverse side of the same coin. 
With the mass withdrawal of the Japanese workforce during World 
War II the industry gradually coUapsed under strains which had long 
been present: a volatile world market, resource exhaustion, and finaUy 
competition from alternative materials. The eventual failure of the 
industry is not easily ascribed to a single causal factor but its 
dependence on Japanese labour was a major weakness, because it 
invited the interest of another nation in this resource industry. 
Australian master pearlers insisted on Japanese labour and therefore 
helped to foster a Japanese interest in the industry. They only protested 
when Japanese sought to deepen their stake in the industry by breaking 
out of their assigned role as cheap labour into the ownership of 
luggers. The Japanese did not somehow 'orchestrate' the failure of 
the industry. It was essentially due to the self-interest and opportunism 
of Australian master pearlers that when the time came for Australia 
to secure her maritime resource for Australians, the government's 
argument to bar the Japanese from pearl-shelling on the continental 
shelf was weak. The industry had allowed itself to become dependent 
on Japanese divers, and its exemption from the White Australia Policy 
was an admission of the inability of Australians to conduct the 
industry without the Japanese. 
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Far from being a kind of innate capacity, the success of Japanese 
as divers was due, in the first instance, to the conditions under which 
they participated in the industry. They were hardworking because the 
relative poverty at home made the money earned in Australia 
attractive, and the lay system of payment offered an incentive to 
maximize the catch in order to increase their earnings. They hoped 
to earn enough money in a short time to enable them to improve their 
position at home upon their return. The building of a substantial 
house, the acquisition of a farm, or the purchase of a boat, which 
their savings afforded them, meant upward social mobility for returned 
divers. They were, on the whole a docile labour force because of their 
tight social organisation marked by kinship recruitment, oyakata 
figures and doshi-kai representation. Their near monopoly of the 
diving role enabled them to impart the benefit of employment in 
Australia to the male members of their extended famiUes. Because 
of their positive attributes, Australian employers found the Japanese 
essential to the industry. The reputation of the Japanese divers became 
a self-perpetuating label favouring the conditions under which they 
could manifest such attributes. 
Matsuo and Ryuchichi Tatsuno who were interned at Hay together 
with Captain Kono, hold up a painting ofKono's lugger Mildred which 
was drawn on a piece of cloth at the camp. 
NOTES 
This essay is based on oral history research conducted for the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority, Townsville, whose assistance is gratefully 
acknowledged. It is a condensed version of part of a Ph.D. thesis to be 
submitted to Griffith University. The age of interviewees at the time of the 
interview is indicated in brackets after each name in the endnotes. 
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Villers-Bretonneux: A Strange Name for 
an Aboriginal Burial Ground 
by David Huggonson 
On Highway 29 between Amiens and St. Quentin is located the French 
town of Villers-Bretonneux. In the cemeteries around the town there 
are 10,982 Australian graves. Thirteen of these graves are the final 
resting places of men who were initially banned from enUsting in a 
combatant role in the Australian Imperial Force during World War 
One. They were descendants of the original inhabitants of the 
Australian continent, the Aborigines. 
The first Aboriginal Digger to be kiUed and buried at Villers-
Bretonneux was Charlie Gage who was born at Eugowra near Forbes, 
New South Wales, in 1891. Private Gage enlisted in February 1916 
and sailed with the 8th Reinforcements to the 30th Battalion. He was 
killed in action in the northern winter on the 3rd December 1916. 
Charles' parents Christopher and Mary Gage were to experience the 
grief of having a second son killed the following September in France. 
